영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Picture a woman who ①receive a plain ceramic mug as a free gift at a conference and, later that afternoon, refuses to sell it for anything less than triple its price in the gift shop downstairs. Before she ②owned the mug, she would never have paid extra for it; once it became hers, however, its value in her mind rose sharply, simply because she now possessed it. Researchers have repeatedly observed this pattern across many everyday objects, from coffee mugs and concert tickets to office chairs and old furniture ③inherited from relatives. Owners consistently demand more money ④to give something up than buyers are willing to offer for that very same item, revealing a curious asymmetry rooted purely in possession itself. Some economists argue that this effect explains why negotiations over inherited property so often collapse, since each side quietly ⑤attaches a different value to what it currently holds.

It would be comforting to believe that anything sufficiently large or obvious appearing ①within our field of vision will automatically capture our attention, yet decades of research into inattentional blindness suggest otherwise. When people are absorbed ②in a demanding task, such as counting how many times a ball is passed between players, they frequently fail to notice an unexpected and conspicuous event unfolding in plain sight, even something as unlikely as a person in a costume walking through the scene. This failure does not stem from a defect in the eyes, which register ③the stimulus perfectly well, but from the fact that conscious perception depends heavily on where attention has been directed. Policymakers ought to take this finding more seriously than they currently do, because it implies that simply placing ④a warning sign within someone's visual range offers no guarantee that it will be consciously registered. Designing safer environments, therefore, requires account ⑤ for the limits of attention itself, not merely assuming that visibility alone ensures awareness.

Long before humans learned to drill for oil, microorganisms had already mastered the art of ①converting sunlight and carbon dioxide into stored chemical energy. Modern biofuel research borrows this ability, cultivating algae or engineered bacteria in large tanks where they can be ②coaxed into producing oils and sugars that can be refined into fuel usable in existing engines. Unlike crops grown for corn-based ethanol, which compete directly with food production for arable land, many algae strains can ③thrive in shallow ponds, wastewater, or even coastal seawater unsuitable for conventional agriculture. Engineers have also learned to tinker with the metabolic pathways of these organisms, ④boosted oil yield far beyond what any wild strain would naturally produce on its own. Despite this progress, producing biofuel at a cost competitive with fossil fuel remains difficult, since harvesting and processing the organisms consumes a substantial share of the energy the fuel itself will eventually ⑤provide.

Consider a student who genuinely intends to study for tomorrow's exam yet, when the evening actually arrives, chooses to ①watch another episode of a favorite show instead, ②promising herself she will surely study harder next week. This pattern, in which the pull of an immediate pleasure overwhelms the value of a distant benefit, ③appear again and again across ordinary life, from postponed exercise to delayed savings. People do not necessarily fail to understand that the future reward matters more; rather, whatever happens right now simply feels disproportionately more urgent and vivid than anything scheduled for later. Behavioral economists note that this preference weakens considerably once both options are ④pushed into the future, which is why planning a diet starting next month feels effortless compared with skipping dessert tonight. Such inconsistency helps explain why gym memberships go ⑤unused and retirement accounts remain underfunded, despite people's stated intentions.

Classical economic theory long assumed that decision makers gather all relevant information, calculate every possible outcome, and select the single option that maximizes their benefit. Herbert Simon, however, questioned this assumption, arguing that human beings operate under real constraints of time, knowledge, and mental capacity that make such ①exhaustive calculation practically impossible. Instead of searching ②endlessly for the theoretically perfect choice, people typically stop once they find an option that seems good enough to meet their immediate needs, a strategy Simon termed satisficing. A shopper comparing refrigerators, for example, rarely examines every model available; she instead sets a few practical criteria, such as price and size, and selects the first appliance that satisfies them ③adequately. This approach is not a failure of reasoning but rather a sensible adaptation to a world where information is ④costly and time is genuinely limited. Consequently, models assuming unlimited rationality often fail to predict actual behavior, while frameworks acknowledging these cognitive boundaries offer a far more ⑤unrealistic account of how ordinary decisions are actually made.

Émile Durkheim insisted that sociology could become a genuine science only if it identified a distinct subject matter that could not be reduced to individual psychology. (A) Language, currency, legal codes, and religious ritual all qualify as social facts, since a person is born into these systems already fully formed and must conform to them regardless of personal preference. (B) He termed this subject matter social facts, defined as ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that exist outside any single individual yet exert a coercive influence over that individual's behavior. (C) Durkheim insisted that social facts should be studied as things, meaning they must be examined empirically through observable patterns such as statistics.

Imagine a teleportation device that scans every atom in your body, transmits that information to a distant station, and reconstructs an exact physical duplicate there, while destroying the original body in the process. (A) Philosophers, however, are troubled by a version of the same device that malfunctions: instead of destroying the original, it leaves the original body intact while still creating a perfect duplicate elsewhere. (B) Now two people exist, each with identical memories and an equally strong claim to being the original traveler, and there is no principled way to decide which one is the real continuation of the person who entered the machine. (C) From the traveler's point of view, stepping into the machine and stepping out on the other side would feel utterly seamless, complete with continuous memories and a sense of having simply walked through a door.

Defenders of the argument insist that because such a zombie is at least conceivable without contradiction, consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. Philosophers sometimes ask their students to imagine a creature physically identical to an ordinary human being in every measurable respect. ( ① ) This imagined being, commonly called a philosophical zombie, walks, talks, laughs, and even cries out in apparent pain when injured, yet has no inner conscious experience whatsoever. ( ② ) It behaves exactly as a conscious person would, since every neuron fires in precisely the same pattern, but there is supposedly nothing it is like to be that creature from the inside. ( ③ ) Yet something crucial, many philosophers insist, seems to be missing from this picture. ( ④ ) Critics respond that mere conceivability proves very little about what is genuinely possible in the real world. ( ⑤ ) Our intuition about zombies, they add, may simply reflect the limits of imagination rather than a real gap in nature.

The player may choose to take only Box B, or to take both boxes, and the prediction has already been made and cannot change at this point. Suppose a mysterious being with a near-perfect track record of predicting human choices presents a player with two boxes. ( ① ) Box A always contains a visible thousand dollars, while Box B contains either a million dollars or nothing at all, depending on a prediction the being made before the game even began. ( ② ) If the being predicted the player would take only Box B, it placed a million dollars inside; if it predicted the player would take both boxes, it left Box B empty. ( ③ ) One line of reasoning says taking both boxes is strictly better, since whatever is already inside the boxes cannot be altered by the player's choice. ( ④ ) A second line of reasoning says taking only Box B is better, since the being's near-perfect accuracy means that choosing both boxes almost guarantees an empty Box B. ( ⑤ ) This apparent conflict between two seemingly sound arguments has made the puzzle a lasting challenge for decision theory.

In other instances, the danger came not from the immune system at all but from where the new gene happened to land. For patients born with a single faulty gene, the disease has traditionally been treated indirectly, managing symptoms for a lifetime rather than addressing the genetic error itself. ( ① ) Gene therapy attempts something more ambitious: delivering a corrected copy of the gene directly into a patient's cells, often using a disabled virus stripped of its ability to cause illness as a delivery vehicle. ( ② ) Once inside the nucleus, the corrected gene can begin producing the protein the patient's body had always lacked, in some cases reversing symptoms that medication alone had never been able to touch. ( ③ ) Early trials were haunted by serious setbacks, including cases in which the delivery virus triggered a dangerous immune reaction. ( ④ ) The virus, in such cases, inserted the new gene in a spot that disrupted other essential genes. ( ⑤ ) Refined delivery methods have since made the treatment considerably safer, and regulators in several countries have now approved gene therapies for a small but growing number of rare inherited disorders.