영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

When engineers design the software ①that controls a self-driving car, they inevitably face a question that philosophers have debated for decades. If a crash becomes unavoidable, should the vehicle protect its own passenger at all costs, or should it be programmed ②minimizing total harm, even if that means steering toward the person inside? Surveys reveal an uncomfortable contradiction: most people say a car should be programmed to save the greater number of lives, yet the same people admit ③they would never buy a vehicle designed to sacrifice its own owner. This gap between the ideal and the personal choice suggests that ethical programming cannot ④be settled by public opinion alone. Manufacturers, regulators, and philosophers must instead agree on transparent rules before autonomous vehicles ⑤are allowed to make such decisions on the road.

Suppose a mad scientist removed a living brain from its body, placed it in a vat of nutrient fluid, and connected its neurons to a supercomputer capable of generating perfectly ①unrealistic sensations. The brain would experience a full and convincing world, complete with a sky, a body, and other people, without ever suspecting that none of it existed outside the simulation. This scenario, unsettling as it sounds, raises a genuinely difficult question for anyone confident in their own perception: how could a person ever ②prove that they are not that very brain right now? Ordinary evidence cannot help, since any proof gathered through the senses would itself be ③generated by the same simulation being tested. Some philosophers conclude that absolute certainty about the external world is simply ④unattainable, while others argue that the mere possibility of deception, however vivid, is not sufficient reason to ⑤abandon our everyday trust in what we perceive.

Classical economic theory long assumed that decision makers gather all relevant information, calculate every possible outcome, and select the single option that maximizes their benefit. Herbert Simon, however, questioned this assumption, arguing that human beings operate under real constraints of time, knowledge, and mental capacity that make such ①exhaustive calculation practically impossible. Instead of searching ②endlessly for the theoretically perfect choice, people typically stop once they find an option that seems good enough to meet their immediate needs, a strategy Simon termed satisficing. A shopper comparing refrigerators, for example, rarely examines every model available; she instead sets a few practical criteria, such as price and size, and selects the first appliance that satisfies them ③adequately. This approach is not a failure of reasoning but rather a sensible adaptation to a world where information is ④costly and time is genuinely limited. Consequently, models assuming unlimited rationality often fail to predict actual behavior, while frameworks acknowledging these cognitive boundaries offer a far more ⑤unrealistic account of how ordinary decisions are actually made.

For much of the twentieth century, memory researchers assumed that once a memory had been consolidated—transformed from a fragile, short-term trace into a stable, long-term representation—it remained essentially fixed, immune to further modification unless the underlying neural circuitry was physically damaged. This assumption, however, was overturned by a body of research demonstrating that _______________, rendering it temporarily susceptible to alteration before it is, in a sense, filed away again. During this narrow window, which typically lasts only a few hours, the memory can be strengthened, weakened, or even subtly distorted by new information encountered in the interim, after which it must undergo a second round of stabilization, a process now widely referred to as reconsolidation. Consequently, what we experience as a stable recollection may actually be a continuously revised construction, reshaped every time it is summoned into conscious awareness and returned to storage.

Classical economic theory assumes that consumers evaluate every price change in the same rational way, weighing marginal benefit against marginal cost regardless of the absolute numbers involved. Behavioral economists, however, have discovered a striking exception: the moment a price drops to exactly zero, people's judgment shifts in a way that ordinary discounting cannot explain. In a well-known laboratory experiment, participants chose between two chocolates, one of higher quality priced at a small fee and one of lower quality offered for free. When both prices were merely reduced by the same amount, most participants still preferred the higher-quality option. Yet once the cheaper chocolate's price was lowered to zero, the majority abruptly switched their preference, even though the price gap between the two options had not actually changed. Researchers explain this reversal by noting that _______________.

Imagine watching a fair coin land on heads five times in a row and feeling an increasingly strong intuition that the next flip is somehow due to produce tails. (A) This intuition, though psychologically compelling, rests on a basic misunderstanding of probability, since each flip of a fair coin remains entirely independent of every flip that came before it. (B) The coin possesses no memory of its previous outcomes, and its probability of landing on tails on the sixth flip stays fixed at fifty percent regardless of how many heads preceded it. (C) Casinos have long profited from this misconception, watching gamblers place larger bets after a losing streak simply because they mistakenly believe that a win has become statistically overdue.

In a classic experiment inspired by Keynes's beauty contest analogy, participants choose a number between zero and one hundred, and the winner is whoever selects the number closest to two-thirds of the average of all guesses submitted. (A) In practice, however, actual guesses rarely converge on zero; most participants stop reasoning after a round or two of imagining what others might guess, producing average guesses that cluster between twenty and thirty-five. (B) A perfectly rational player, assuming every other participant reasons with unlimited depth, would conclude the equilibrium number is zero, since reasoning about others' reasoning collapses the average toward that single point. (C) This gap between theoretical equilibrium and observed behavior reveals that human reasoning is bounded, and economists use this simple game as a diagnostic tool for measuring the depth of that reasoning.

Whether this asymmetry of influence should be celebrated as protective or condemned as paternalistic remains a genuinely open question. Consider a nudge designed to help elderly patients adhere to complex medication schedules by defaulting them into automatic pharmacy refills and reminder calls. ( ① ) Advocates point out that many elderly patients struggle to manage complicated schedules independently, and that a well-designed default can meaningfully improve health outcomes without removing any patient's ability to opt out. ( ② ) Skeptics respond that elderly patients may be less likely than younger populations to notice that a default has been set on their behalf, let alone to exercise the option of opting out even when they might prefer to. ( ③ ) Both sides agree that the intervention influences behavior more powerfully among vulnerable patients than it would among a more attentive population. ( ④ ) What they dispute is not the existence of this heightened influence but its proper ethical interpretation. ( ⑤ ) Ultimately, resolving this disagreement requires weighing the genuine health benefits of the program against the diminished practical capacity of some patients to resist it.

In purely material terms, of course, rejecting the offer leaves the responder objectively worse off than accepting it would have. In a typical round of the ultimatum game, a proposer offers to keep eighty percent of a sum of money, leaving only twenty percent for the responder. ( ① ) A responder who values only material gain should accept this offer without hesitation, since twenty percent of something is still more than one hundred percent of nothing. ( ② ) In practice, however, a substantial proportion of responders reject such lopsided offers outright. ( ③ ) Both participants then receive nothing, an outcome that a purely self-interested calculator would never choose voluntarily. ( ④ ) Researchers interpret this pattern as evidence that people are willing to incur a personal cost in order to punish behavior they perceive as exploitative. ( ⑤ ) This willingness to sacrifice material gain for the sake of fairness appears consistently across many different cultures, though the specific threshold for what counts as an unfair offer can vary considerably.

Contemporary sociologists continue to debate whether digital networks represent a genuine revival of Gemeinschaft-style community or merely extend Gesellschaft's impersonal logic into new, more intimate-seeming spaces. German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished between two fundamentally different forms of social organization, which he termed Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. ( ① ) Gemeinschaft, often translated as community, describes relationships bound by close kinship, shared tradition, and face-to-face familiarity, typical of small villages. ( ② ) Gesellschaft, often translated as society, describes relationships organized around impersonal contracts, self-interest, and formal law, typical of large cities. ( ③ ) Tönnies did not regard one form as simply superior to the other; rather, he saw the shift from Gemeinschaft toward Gesellschaft as a defining feature of modernization. ( ④ ) This shift brought greater efficiency and individual freedom while weakening the dense emotional bonds that once held communities together. ( ⑤ )