영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Consider a village green shared freely by every herder in the community, where each individual may graze as many animals as they wish without ①paying any fee. From the perspective of any single herder, adding one more animal to the shared pasture ②brings a clear personal benefit, since the extra income belongs entirely to that herder alone. The cost of the additional grazing, however, is spread thinly across every herder who uses the green, so no single individual ③bears more than a tiny fraction of the damage. Because this calculation favors adding more animals for every rational herder, the shared pasture is gradually overgrazed until it can no longer ④support any animals at all, harming the very community whose rational members caused the collapse. Philosophers use this scenario to illustrate a troubling gap between what benefits an individual in the short term and what preserves a shared resource in the long term, a gap that voluntary self-restraint alone rarely ⑤closing.

Imagine a man locked inside a room who does not understand a single word of Chinese, yet who ①possesses a giant rulebook written entirely in English. Slips of paper covered with Chinese characters ②are passed in through a slot, and by following the rulebook's instructions step by step, he produces replies that appear fluent to anyone outside. From the perspective of a native speaker reading the responses, the room seems ③understanding Chinese perfectly. Yet the man inside understands nothing at all; he is merely manipulating shapes according to formal rules, without ④grasping their meaning. This scenario was designed to challenge the assumption that a computer running a sophisticated program truly understands language simply because it produces convincing output, ⑤passing every external test of intelligence.

Consider a student who ①genuinely intends to study for tomorrow's exam yet, when the evening actually arrives, chooses to watch another episode of a favorite show instead, promising herself she will surely study harder next week. This pattern, in which the pull of an immediate pleasure ②overwhelms the value of a distant benefit, appears again and again across ordinary life, from postponed exercise to delayed savings. People do not necessarily fail to understand that the future reward matters more; rather, whatever happens right now simply feels disproportionately more urgent and vivid than anything scheduled for later. Behavioral economists note that this preference ③weakens considerably once both options are pushed into the future, which is why planning a diet starting next month feels ④impossible compared with skipping dessert tonight. Such inconsistency helps explain why gym memberships go unused and retirement accounts remain ⑤underfunded, despite people's stated intentions.

Philosophers often pair the classic trolley problem with a companion case designed to test whether our moral intuitions are actually ①consistent. Imagine a brilliant surgeon who has five patients, each dying from the failure of a different organ, and one healthy visitor in the waiting room whose organs happen to be a perfect ②match for all five. If the surgeon secretly killed the healthy visitor and transplanted the organs, five lives would be saved at the cost of one, exactly the same arithmetic used to justify diverting a runaway trolley onto a track with a single worker. Yet almost everyone who accepts the trolley diversion ③recoils immediately at the idea of the surgeon cutting up an unwilling patient, even though the numbers are identical in both cases. Philosophers use this contrast to argue that outcomes alone can ④fully explain our moral judgments, since something about directly using a person's body as a mere means appears to matter deeply to most people's sense of ⑤right and wrong.

Philosophers sometimes ask their students to imagine a creature physically identical to an ordinary human being in every measurable respect, one that walks, talks, laughs, and even cries out in apparent pain when injured, yet that has no inner conscious experience whatsoever. This imagined being, commonly called a philosophical zombie, behaves ②completely differently from a conscious person, since every neuron fires in precisely the same pattern, but there is supposedly nothing it is like to be that creature from the inside. Defenders of the argument claim that because such a zombie is at least ①conceivable without any logical contradiction, consciousness itself cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. Critics respond that mere conceivability ③proves very little about what is genuinely possible in the real world, and that our intuition about zombies may simply ④reflect the limits of imagination rather than a real gap in ⑤nature.

Political philosophers have long debated how much authority, if any, a government may legitimately claim over free individuals. Robert Nozick imagined a hypothetical starting point in which people live without any state at all, each relying on private arrangements to protect their own person and property. He argued that a minimal state, limited strictly to enforcing contracts and protecting citizens from violence, theft, and fraud, could arise gradually through a series of voluntary exchanges, without anyone's rights ever being violated along the way. Critics on one side, the anarchists, insist that even this minimal government inevitably violates the rights of those who never consented to join it. Critics on the other side argue that a state limited to bare protection cannot address deeper inequalities that arise naturally in any free market. Nozick's thought experiment therefore _______________.

Bacteria have been cutting up invading viral DNA for billions of years, long before any scientist thought to borrow the trick for use in a laboratory. The CRISPR-Cas9 system relies on a short guide RNA that matches a specific DNA sequence, _______________. Once Cas9 arrives at the target site, it slices both strands of the DNA helix, and the cell's own repair machinery rushes in to mend the cut, often introducing a small change in the process. By supplying the cell with a template during this repair step, scientists can direct that machinery to insert a specific new sequence rather than merely disabling the original gene. What once required years of painstaking work to alter a single gene can now be accomplished within days.

Two drivers, equally distracted by their phones, run a red light in exactly the same careless manner. (A) Although both drivers behaved identically and made exactly the same reckless choice, society judges them very differently: one faces criminal charges and lifelong guilt, while the other receives, at most, a minor traffic ticket. (B) Philosophers call this troubling asymmetry moral luck, since factors entirely outside a person's control end up determining how severely we judge their moral character. (C) By pure chance, a child happens to be crossing the street in front of one driver but not the other, and the first driver kills the child while the second drives through safely.

Time travel to the past has long fascinated physicists and philosophers alike, but it also generates a famously troubling contradiction. (A) The story therefore loops endlessly, undermining itself at every turn rather than settling into any stable outcome. (B) If the grandfather never had children, the traveler themselves would never have been born, and could never have existed to make the trip in the first place; yet if the traveler never made the trip, the grandfather would have survived to meet the grandmother after all. (C) Suppose a traveler journeyed backward in time and, through some combination of accident and intention, prevented their own grandfather from ever meeting their grandmother.

Philosophers return to this old story again and again, not because they care about timber, but because it forces us to ask a far deeper question about identity itself. The ancient puzzle known as the ship of Theseus asks a deceptively simple question. ( ① ) If every plank of a wooden ship is replaced one by one over many years, is the vessel that eventually results still the same ship it once was? ( ② ) Most people's first instinct is to answer yes, since each individual replacement seems too small to erase the ship's identity. ( ③ ) The puzzle grows far sharper, however, once a second twist is introduced: suppose a careful collector gathered every discarded plank and reassembled them into a second vessel, built exactly as the original once stood. ( ④ ) Two ships would then exist side by side, each with an equal claim to being the genuine one, and no obvious way to decide between them. ( ⑤ ) Whether identity depends on continuous material, continuous form, or some deeper thread, no single answer has ever fully satisfied everyone who has taken up the question.