영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Imagine a distant planet ①identically to Earth in every visible respect, except that the clear liquid its inhabitants call "water" is not H2O but a different compound, XYZ, that happens ②to look, taste, and behave exactly the same. When an Earthling and a Twin Earthling each say the word "water," they seem to mean the same thing, since neither could tell the substances apart without a chemistry lab. Philosopher Hilary Putnam ③used this scenario to argue that the meaning of a word is not determined solely by what happens inside a speaker's head. Even though the two speakers hold identical thoughts and mental images when they use the word, their statements refer to two different substances, because the underlying chemical composition, not personal belief, ④fixes what a word ultimately picks out. Meaning, Putnam concluded, depends partly on the world outside the mind, not merely on the private mental states of ⑤whoever happens to be speaking.

The ancient puzzle known as the ship of Theseus asks a deceptively ①simple question. If every plank of a wooden ship is replaced one by one over many years, is the vessel that eventually results still the same ship it once was? Most people's first instinct is to answer yes, since each individual replacement seems too ②small to erase the ship's identity. The puzzle grows far ③duller, however, once a second twist is introduced. Suppose a careful collector gathered every discarded plank and reassembled them into a second vessel, built exactly as the original once stood. Two ships would then exist side by side, each with an equal claim to being the ④genuine one, and no obvious way to decide between them. Philosophers return to this old story again and again, not because they care about timber, but because it forces us to ask whether identity depends on continuous material, continuous form, or some deeper thread that neither one can fully ⑤explain.

Two drivers, equally distracted by their phones, run a red light in exactly the same careless manner. By pure chance, a child happens to be crossing the street in front of one driver but not the other; the first driver kills the child, while the second driver drives through safely and never even notices the danger. Although both drivers behaved ①identically and made exactly the same reckless choice, society judges them very differently: one faces criminal charges and lifelong guilt, while the other receives, at most, a minor traffic ticket. Philosophers call this troubling ②asymmetry moral luck, since factors entirely outside a person's control end up determining how severely we judge their moral character. If moral responsibility is supposed to ③depend heavily on luck and circumstance rather than on what a person chooses and intends, this outcome seems deeply unfair, yet few people are willing to excuse the unlucky driver as if nothing worse had happened. Moral luck suggests that our everyday judgments rest on a foundation far ④shakier than we usually like to admit, a fact many find genuinely ⑤unsettling.

As efforts to ①curb greenhouse gas emissions intensify, industries unable to eliminate carbon dioxide from their processes have turned to a technology known as carbon capture and storage. This technology involves separating carbon dioxide from the exhaust of power plants before it is released into the atmosphere, then transporting the captured gas for underground injection. Once injected into porous rock formations, the gas is trapped beneath layers of impermeable rock that prevent it from escaping into the air. Proponents argue that carbon capture and storage functions as a bridge technology, allowing heavy industries to keep operating while more sustainable alternatives are ②developed. For instance, cement and steel production, both of which release carbon dioxide as an ③unavoidable byproduct of chemical reactions, are considered prime candidates for this approach. However, critics contend that the technology remains prohibitively ④cheap and that building pipelines requires investments few companies make voluntarily. Despite such concerns, many governments continue funding pilot projects, convinced that this technology will play an ⑤indispensable role in reaching emission targets.

The ecological footprint, a widely cited measure of how much biologically productive land and water a population requires to sustain its consumption, has become one of the most ①familiar tools for communicating humanity's environmental impact. By converting diverse activities, from driving to eating meat, into a single unit of land area, the measure allows policymakers to grasp whether a lifestyle exceeds what the planet can regenerate. This simplicity, however, is also the source of its most ②occasional criticism. Because the footprint aggregates dissimilar impacts, such as carbon emissions and water scarcity, into one composite figure, it can ③obscure important differences among problems that require distinct policy responses. A region might reduce its footprint by lowering carbon emissions while simultaneously depleting a local aquifer, yet the aggregate number could still appear to improve, ④concealing damage that demands urgent attention. Furthermore, the method assumes that all bio-productive land is roughly ⑤interchangeable, treating a hectare of forest as equivalent to a hectare of farmland, even though the two provide markedly different ecological functions.

John Rawls proposed an unusual thought experiment to determine what principles of justice a society ought to adopt. Imagine a group of rational people gathered to design the basic rules of their future society, but placed behind what he called a veil of ignorance, a condition under which ①none of them knows their own race, gender, wealth, talents, or social position in advance. Since no one can predict whether they will be born into privilege or poverty, each person has a strong incentive to choose rules that ②protect the worst-off members of society, rather than rules that merely favor whichever group they happen to belong to. Rawls argued that rational people placed in this position would not gamble on inequality; instead, they would favor arrangements that guarantee basic liberties for everyone and permit unequal outcomes only when those outcomes actually ③benefit the least advantaged. Justice, on this view, is what ④impartial reasoning produces once self-interest is ⑤maximized.

When a resource is shared among many users, none of whom bears the full cost of its depletion, _______________. This dynamic, famously labeled the tragedy of the commons, describes how shared pastures and fisheries can be degraded even when every participant privately understands the danger of overuse. A single herder who adds one more animal to a communal pasture gains the entire benefit of that addition, whereas the resulting damage to the grass is shared among other herders who depend on the land. Because self-interest offers no incentive to restrain consumption unilaterally, the resource tends to be exhausted long before any user intends such an outcome. For decades, economists assumed that only two remedies existed: strict regulation or the conversion of shared resources into private property. Elinor Ostrom challenged this assumption, however, by documenting communities that had sustainably managed fisheries and forests for generations through locally devised rules and mutual monitoring rather than external control.

Defenders of the argument insist that because such a zombie is at least conceivable without contradiction, consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. Philosophers sometimes ask their students to imagine a creature physically identical to an ordinary human being in every measurable respect. ( ① ) This imagined being, commonly called a philosophical zombie, walks, talks, laughs, and even cries out in apparent pain when injured, yet has no inner conscious experience whatsoever. ( ② ) It behaves exactly as a conscious person would, since every neuron fires in precisely the same pattern, but there is supposedly nothing it is like to be that creature from the inside. ( ③ ) Yet something crucial, many philosophers insist, seems to be missing from this picture. ( ④ ) Critics respond that mere conceivability proves very little about what is genuinely possible in the real world. ( ⑤ ) Our intuition about zombies, they add, may simply reflect the limits of imagination rather than a real gap in nature.

This harms the very community whose rational members, each behaving perfectly rationally as individuals, together caused its collapse. Consider a village green shared freely by every herder in the community, where each individual may graze as many animals as they wish without paying any fee. ( ① ) From the perspective of any single herder, adding one more animal to the shared pasture brings a clear personal benefit, since the extra income belongs entirely to that herder alone. ( ② ) The cost of the additional grazing, however, is spread thinly across every herder who uses the green, so no single individual bears more than a tiny fraction of the damage. Because this calculation favors adding more animals for every rational herder, the shared pasture is gradually overgrazed until it can no longer support any animals at all. ( ③ ) Philosophers use this scenario to illustrate a troubling gap between what benefits an individual in the short term and what preserves a shared resource in the long term. ( ④ ) It is a gap, moreover, that voluntary self-restraint alone rarely closes. ( ⑤ )

주어진 문장: Each of these exchanges is deliberately planned so that a byproduct considered worthless by one company becomes a valuable resource for its neighbor. Conventional industrial zones typically operate as isolated facilities, each purchasing raw materials independently and disposing of waste without regard for neighboring plants, even when one factory's discarded byproduct could serve as valuable input for another. ① An eco-industrial park reorganizes this arrangement by clustering diverse companies within a single area and encouraging them to exchange materials, energy, and water through a practice known as industrial symbiosis. ② A power plant's surplus heat, for example, might be piped to a nearby greenhouse, while a food processing facility's organic waste could be converted into biogas that powers another factory's equipment. ③ Such exchanges require companies to coordinate schedules and share information they might otherwise regard as proprietary, a level of cooperation rarely achieved without deliberate institutional support. ④ Local governments therefore often play a coordinating role, mapping which industries could exchange resources and providing incentives for companies willing to participate. ⑤ Consequently, eco-industrial parks have come to be seen as a model capable of reducing both waste disposal costs and raw material expenses simultaneously. ① ② ③ ④ ⑤