영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

When sociologist Émile Durkheim studied suicide rates across different societies, he noticed something ①puzzling: rates rose not only during economic depression but also during sudden prosperity. He concluded that both crises share a common feature, the collapse of shared norms that once told individuals what to expect and how ②to behave. Durkheim called this state of normlessness anomie, arguing that rapid social change can strip away the moral guidelines ③what regulate human desire, leaving individuals disoriented even when material conditions improve. Decades later, Robert Merton extended the concept to explain deviance within stable societies, ④proposing that anomie also arises when a culture insists that everyone pursue identical goals. Faced with this gap between aspiration and opportunity, some individuals conform, but others turn to innovation, ritual, retreat, ⑤or rebellion.

Military researchers have developed weapons systems ①capable of identifying and engaging targets without a human pressing the final button, a prospect that has ②alarmed arms control experts for over a decade. Advocates within defense agencies argue that autonomous systems can react faster than any human operator and may even reduce casualties by removing fear and fatigue from split-second decisions. Human rights organizations counter that removing a person from the final decision ③strip away moral responsibility at the exact moment it matters most, since a machine cannot be held accountable in any meaningful sense. Diplomatic negotiations toward an international treaty have repeatedly ④stalled, partly because military powers disagree on how to define autonomy precisely enough to regulate it. Meanwhile, the underlying technology continues to advance regardless of ⑤whether the diplomacy meant to govern it keeps pace.

Classical economic models typically assume that people discount future rewards at a constant rate, ①valuing a reward received later somewhat less than an identical reward received now. Empirical observation, however, reveals a different pattern: people apply a much steeper discount to the immediate future than to the distant future, a phenomenon ②termed hyperbolic discounting. This inconsistency explains why an individual might sincerely resolve tonight to wake up early and exercise tomorrow, only to postpone the plan once tomorrow actually arrives and the immediate discomfort of getting out of bed ③become vivid and present. When the reward or cost in question lies safely in the future, its emotional weight remains muted, ④allowing rational long-term goals to dominate one's stated intentions. Once that same reward or cost draws near, however, its immediacy triggers a disproportionately strong emotional pull, frequently ⑤overriding the very plans made earlier with such apparent confidence.

Standard economic theory assumes that money is fungible, meaning that a dollar earned as salary is functionally identical to a dollar received as a tax refund or won in a lottery. In practice, however, people routinely sort their finances into separate mental accounts, ①treating money differently depending on its source or intended purpose, a process economists call mental accounting. A household that would never dip into its retirement savings to pay for a vacation might nonetheless spend an unexpected bonus on that very trip without hesitation, even though both sums ②are, in strictly financial terms, equally available for either purpose. This compartmentalization can produce decisions that appear inconsistent when viewed through a purely rational lens: the same individual who diligently saves a portion of every paycheck may simultaneously ③carrying high-interest credit card debt, effectively paying more to borrow than they earn on their savings. Mental accounting is not always harmful, however; by assigning specific categories to specific funds, individuals can also impose useful discipline on their spending, ④preventing money earmarked for essential needs from being diverted toward impulsive purchases. The practice thus reveals that financial behavior is guided less by pure arithmetic than by psychological categories that individuals ⑤impose on money's origin and purpose.

As private companies develop the technology to mine asteroids for rare metals and water, a legal question once confined to science fiction has suddenly become ①urgent: who, if anyone, owns the resources of outer space? Existing international treaties state that no nation may claim sovereignty over celestial bodies, but they say remarkably ②little about whether a private company may extract and sell what it finds there. Some governments have already passed domestic laws granting their own companies rights to material mined in space, a move that other nations view as a ③collective attempt to settle a question that should be decided collectively. Supporters of space mining argue that new resources could ④ease shortages on Earth and fund further exploration, while critics ⑤warn that treating space as an open frontier for extraction risks repeating the same mistakes that colonization caused on Earth.

Hospitals are increasingly adopting artificial intelligence tools that can scan medical images and flag potential tumors faster than experienced radiologists. (A) The doctor may argue that they simply trusted a tool the hospital required them to use, while the hospital may blame the software company instead. (B) Yet the growing reliance on these tools raises an uncomfortable legal question: when an AI system misses a diagnosis, who is responsible? (C) Until legal systems clarify this chain of responsibility, patients harmed by an algorithmic error may find themselves with no clear party to hold accountable.

For much of the twentieth century, memory researchers assumed that once a memory had been consolidated—transformed from a fragile, short-term trace into a stable, long-term representation—it remained essentially fixed, immune to further modification unless the underlying neural circuitry was physically damaged. (A) During this narrow window, which typically lasts only a few hours, the memory can be strengthened, weakened, or even subtly distorted by new information encountered in the interim, after which it must undergo a second round of stabilization, a process now widely referred to as reconsolidation. (B) Consequently, what we experience as a stable recollection may actually be a continuously revised construction, reshaped every time it is summoned into conscious awareness and returned to storage. (C) This assumption, however, was overturned by a body of research demonstrating that the act of retrieval itself can destabilize a previously consolidated memory, rendering it temporarily susceptible to alteration before it is, in a sense, filed away again.

It would be comforting to believe that anything sufficiently large or obvious appearing within our field of vision will automatically capture our attention, yet decades of research into inattentional blindness suggest otherwise. (A) This failure does not stem from a defect in the eyes, which register the stimulus perfectly well, but from the fact that conscious perception depends heavily on where attention has been directed. (B) When people are absorbed in a demanding task, such as counting how many times a ball is passed between players, they frequently fail to notice an unexpected and conspicuous event unfolding in plain sight, even something as unlikely as a person in a costume walking through the scene. (C) Policymakers ought to take this finding more seriously than they currently do, because it implies that simply placing a warning sign within someone's visual range offers no guarantee that it will be consciously registered. Designing safer environments, therefore, requires accounting for the limits of attention itself, not merely assuming that visibility alone ensures awareness.

Yet the objective probability of survival in both scenarios is, of course, mathematically identical. Framing effects appear with particular force in decisions involving risk and uncertainty. ( ① ) When physicians describe a treatment option in terms of a survival rate, patients tend to view the treatment favorably and are more inclined to proceed. ( ② ) When the very same statistic is instead presented as a mortality rate, patient enthusiasm for the identical treatment drops noticeably. ( ③ ) This asymmetry persists even among physicians themselves, who might be expected to evaluate probabilities more analytically than the general public. ( ④ ) The persistence of this bias among trained professionals suggests that framing effects operate below the level of deliberate reasoning, influencing judgment before conscious analysis even begins. ( ⑤ ) Understanding this tendency allows communicators to present information more responsibly, regardless of which frame ultimately proves more persuasive.

주어진 문장: This effect was first demonstrated systematically through a series of controlled laboratory experiments conducted in the 1970s. Eyewitness testimony has long carried weight in courtrooms, yet decades of research reveal that memories of witnessed events are more malleable than most people assume. ( ① ) When individuals who observe an event are later exposed to misleading information about what they saw, whether through a leading question or a conversation with another witness, their recollections frequently incorporate details that never occurred, a phenomenon known as the misinformation effect. ( ② ) In one classic paradigm, participants who watched a video of a traffic accident and were then asked how fast the cars were going when they smashed into each other reported higher speed estimates and were more likely to falsely recall broken glass than participants asked the identical question using the milder verb hit. ( ③ ) Crucially, these distorted memories often feel genuine to the person experiencing them, since the original memory trace becomes blended with the newly introduced information rather than existing as a separate, contradictory record. ( ④ ) Such findings have prompted legal systems to adopt cautious interviewing protocols designed to minimize suggestive questioning during investigations. ( ⑤ )