영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Many households save far less for retirement than conventional financial advice would recommend, not necessarily because they ①lacks the resources to do so, but because a combination of procrastination, present bias, and the discomfort of forgoing current consumption repeatedly delays the decision to begin saving. Recognizing this gap between intention and action, some economists have proposed a savings program in which employees commit today to ②allocating a portion of their future salary increases toward retirement savings, rather than being asked to reduce their current take-home pay immediately. Because the sacrifice applies only to income not yet received, the commitment ③feels far less painful than an equivalent reduction in present earnings would, making employees considerably more willing to enroll. Once enrolled, the contribution rate automatically rises with each subsequent raise, ④gradually increasing savings without requiring any further deliberate action from participants. Field trials of such programs have reported substantial increases in average savings rates over several years, alongside participant satisfaction that ⑤remains notably high.

For much of its history, economic theory treated emotion as a distortion ①to be eliminated from otherwise rational calculation, an obstacle standing between decision-makers and their true self-interest. More recent research, however, suggests that emotion ②function not merely as noise but as an integral component of sound judgment, one that supplies information conventional reasoning alone cannot readily access. Individuals who, due to specific neurological conditions, lose the capacity to experience emotion while retaining otherwise normal cognitive abilities frequently ③struggle to make even simple decisions, spending excessive time weighing options that most people resolve almost instantly through a felt sense of what seems right. This observation suggests that emotional responses often ④function as rapid heuristics, allowing individuals to bypass exhaustive deliberation by relying on accumulated affective associations built from past experience. Financial regulators have begun incorporating this understanding into policy design, recognizing that decisions made under conditions of acute emotional arousal often ⑤depart substantially from the measured judgment that individuals would exhibit under calmer circumstances.

Conventional economic wisdom holds that more options are always preferable to fewer, since a larger set of alternatives increases the likelihood that any individual will find one that precisely ①matches their preferences. Empirical research on consumer behavior, however, complicates this assumption considerably. When shoppers are presented with an extensive array of choices, they frequently experience heightened anxiety about making the wrong selection and, paradoxically, ②become less likely to make any purchase or decision at all. This phenomenon, commonly ③called choice overload, arises because evaluating numerous alternatives demands considerable cognitive effort, and the fear of forgoing a superior but unexamined option can overwhelm the pleasure of selecting from a limited set. Furthermore, individuals who do eventually choose from an overwhelming array often ④reports lower satisfaction with their selection than those who chose from a modest handful of options. Businesses that recognize this dynamic have begun deliberately ⑤curating smaller, carefully selected assortments.

Financial markets occasionally experience episodes in which asset prices rise far beyond any level that careful analysis of underlying fundamentals could justify, a phenomenon commonly attributed to herd psychology. During such episodes, individual investors, observing that prices have already risen substantially, often conclude that continuing to buy is ①reasonable simply because so many others are doing the same, rather than because any independent evaluation supports the purchase. This dynamic can become self-perpetuating: rising prices attract new buyers, whose purchases push prices higher still, thereby attracting yet another wave of buyers convinced that the upward trend itself constitutes ②reliable evidence of underlying value. Historical episodes of speculative excess display a strikingly similar pattern, suggesting that the underlying psychological mechanism remains ③variable even as the specific assets involved change considerably across centuries. Eventually, however, some triggering event, however minor, prompts a portion of investors to ④reconsider their assumptions, and the resulting wave of selling can trigger a collapse every bit as rapid and self-reinforcing as the original ⑤ascent.

Traditional economic models predict that a rational individual offered any positive sum of money, however small, should ①accept it without hesitation, since even a modest gain is preferable to receiving nothing at all. When the proposer offers a division perceived as ②unfair, such as retaining ninety percent of the sum for themselves, the second participant frequently rejects the offer entirely, leaving both parties with nothing rather than accepting an outcome viewed as insulting. This behavior indicates that individuals value fairness as an end in itself, sometimes willingly ③sacrificing material gain to punish perceived exploitation. Neuroscientific investigations complement this finding, revealing that unfair offers activate brain regions associated with ④pleasure and negative emotion, suggesting that the rejection of unfairness is not merely a calculated strategic move but also an emotionally driven response. Such evidence challenges the assumption that economic actors pursue only their own material self-interest, demonstrating instead that considerations of equity can ⑤override the straightforward pursuit of maximum individual gain.

A rational approach to decision-making dictates that only future costs and benefits should influence a choice, since resources already spent cannot be ①recovered regardless of what is decided next. In practice, however, people routinely allow such irrecoverable expenditures, known as sunk costs, to shape their subsequent decisions, a pattern referred to as the sunk cost fallacy. A moviegoer who finds a film thoroughly ②disappointing after the first thirty minutes will often remain in the theater until the credits roll, reasoning that leaving early would somehow waste the money already spent on the ticket. Organizations exhibit the same fallacy on a larger scale: a company that has invested heavily in a failing project frequently ③abandons funding it, arguing that stopping the project now would render the prior investment meaningless. Yet continuing to invest in a venture destined to fail merely adds new losses to old ones, ④compounding the very waste the decision-makers hoped to avoid. Economists therefore urge decision-makers to evaluate each choice based solely on its prospective outcomes, treating past expenditures as ⑤irrelevant to the decision at hand.

Marketers have long recognized that perceived scarcity can dramatically increase a product's desirability, even when the item's intrinsic qualities remain entirely unchanged. A retailer who labels a product as "limited edition" or displays a countdown timer beside a discounted offer prompts customers to make hurried purchase decisions they might otherwise postpone or reconsider. Consumers who later reflect calmly on such purchases frequently discover that the item's actual usefulness fell well short of the ___________ they experienced at the moment of decision.

Eyewitness testimony has long carried weight in courtrooms, yet decades of research reveal that memories of witnessed events are more malleable than most people assume. (A) When individuals who observe an event are later exposed to misleading information about what they saw, whether through a leading question or a conversation with another witness, their recollections frequently incorporate details that never occurred, a phenomenon known as the misinformation effect. (B) Crucially, these distorted memories often feel genuine to the person experiencing them, since the original memory trace becomes blended with the newly introduced information rather than existing as a separate, contradictory record. Such findings have prompted legal systems to adopt cautious interviewing protocols designed to minimize suggestive questioning during investigations. (C) In one classic paradigm, participants who watched a video of a traffic accident and were then asked how fast the cars were going when they smashed into each other reported higher speed estimates and were more likely to falsely recall broken glass than participants asked the identical question using the milder verb hit.

The ethical debate surrounding nudging often intensifies when the technique is applied to particularly vulnerable populations. (A) Elderly individuals facing complex decisions about long-term care, for example, may be especially susceptible to defaults and framing effects, raising the stakes of any given choice architecture considerably. (B) Some ethicists argue that heightened vulnerability actually strengthens the case for carefully designed nudges, since vulnerable individuals may otherwise fall prey to more overtly exploitative influences, such as aggressive sales tactics, if a beneficial default is not established first. (C) Others insist that heightened vulnerability demands greater caution rather than more intervention, since those least equipped to resist a nudge are also least equipped to recognize when it no longer serves their genuine interests.

주어진 문장: This buying and selling of allowances effectively creates a market price for carbon, one that fluctuates according to how difficult reduction proves across different industries. Emissions trading, a market-based mechanism for curbing greenhouse gases, allows governments to set an overall limit on carbon output while letting firms trade permits within that limit. ① Under this system, known as cap-and-trade, companies that cut emissions more cheaply than required can sell surplus allowances to firms facing higher reduction costs. ② Proponents argue that this flexibility lets society reach a given environmental target at the lowest overall cost, since abatement shifts toward whoever can achieve it most economically. ③ Critics, however, contend that trading schemes frequently allocate too many permits, a flaw that has historically depressed carbon prices and blunted incentives to invest in cleaner technology. ④ For example, early phases of several regional markets granted allowances so generously that permit prices collapsed, leaving polluters with little pressure to change their practices. ⑤ Consequently, many economists now advocate combining trading with a price floor, a minimum permit price that keeps the market from collapsing during weak demand, thereby preserving the cost-effectiveness for which trading is valued. ① ② ③ ④ ⑤