영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

When people look back on a multi-day journey, they rarely ①recall every hour with equal clarity; instead, memory tends to compress the entire experience into just a few representative moments. Psychologists have found that two points carry disproportionate weight in this process: the single moment when emotion, whether joy or discomfort, ②reached its highest intensity, and whatever happened right before the experience concluded. Consider two hikers who complete an identical five-day trek. The first finishes with a grueling, rain-soaked final climb, while the second enjoys a calm, scenic descent on the last afternoon despite having ③endure an equally difficult ascent earlier in the trip. Even though both hikers faced comparable hardship overall, the second is far more likely to remember the journey fondly, simply because the trip ④ended pleasantly. This pattern reveals that overall satisfaction is not calculated as an average of every experienced moment; rather, it is shaped disproportionately by whichever moments ⑤felt most intense and by however the experience happened to end.

As nudging has moved from academic theory into widespread practice, a persistent ethical question has accompanied its rise: at what point ①does subtly guiding behavior for someone's own benefit shade into manipulation that undermines their capacity for autonomous choice? Proponents typically distinguish nudges from manipulation by pointing to transparency and reversibility, arguing that a legitimate nudge ②operate openly, can be easily resisted by anyone who wishes to opt out, and ultimately serves the interests of the person being nudged rather than the interests of whoever designed the intervention. Critics counter that this distinction often collapses in practice, since many effective nudges work precisely because they ③exploit cognitive processes operating below conscious awareness, meaning that the person being influenced may never fully register that a nudge is even occurring. A supermarket that arranges healthier foods at eye level, for instance, differs only in the direction of its influence, not in its underlying mechanism, from a supermarket that ④arranges the most profitable items at eye level. This tension suggests that the ethical status of a nudge cannot be evaluated by examining its psychological mechanism alone; instead, it must be judged according to the intentions of the party who ⑤designs it and the outcome that design is intended to produce.

Devices that translate brain activity directly into digital commands have moved from laboratory experiments to real medical use, ①allowing paralyzed patients to control a robotic arm or type a message using thought alone. As the technology improves, some developers envision a future in which brain-computer interfaces extend beyond restoring lost function ②toward enhancing healthy minds, offering faster memory or expanded attention to anyone ③willing to undergo the procedure. This prospect raises a philosophical question that medicine alone cannot answer: if a device can alter memory, mood, or decision-making, at what point does the assistance stop ④being a tool and start reshaping the very identity of the person using it. Neuroethicists argue that mental privacy, the ability to keep one's own thoughts free from external access or manipulation, may need ⑤recognizing as a fundamental right before this technology becomes widespread.

When engineers design the software ①that controls a self-driving car, they inevitably face a question that philosophers have debated for decades. If a crash becomes unavoidable, should the vehicle protect its own passenger at all costs, or should it be programmed ②minimizing total harm, even if that means steering toward the person inside? Surveys reveal an uncomfortable contradiction: most people say a car should be programmed to save the greater number of lives, yet the same people admit ③they would never buy a vehicle designed to sacrifice its own owner. This gap between the ideal and the personal choice suggests that ethical programming cannot ④be settled by public opinion alone. Manufacturers, regulators, and philosophers must instead agree on transparent rules before autonomous vehicles ⑤are allowed to make such decisions on the road.

Conventional economic wisdom holds that more options are always preferable to fewer, since a larger set of alternatives ①increases the likelihood that any individual will find one that precisely matches their preferences. When shoppers are presented with an extensive array of choices, they frequently experience heightened anxiety about making the wrong selection and, paradoxically, become ②less likely to make any purchase or decision at all. Furthermore, individuals who do eventually choose from an overwhelming array often report ③higher satisfaction with their selection than those who chose from a modest handful of options, since the sheer number of unexplored alternatives ④fosters lingering doubt about whether a better choice was overlooked. Businesses that recognize this dynamic have begun deliberately ⑤curating smaller, carefully selected assortments, betting that a narrower range of options can sometimes generate more sales and greater customer satisfaction than abundance.

A few years ago, spotting a manipulated video required a trained eye and ①specialized software. Today, freely available applications allow almost anyone to swap a face or fabricate a voice ②convincingly enough to fool casual viewers within minutes. This shift has quietly ③reinforced one of the oldest assumptions in human communication: that seeing and hearing something is a reasonably reliable way to confirm it happened. Journalists now face the burden of verifying footage that once would have been accepted as ④self-evident proof. Perhaps more troubling than any single fake video is the broader effect on public trust, in which genuine footage can be ⑤dismissed as fabricated simply because deepfakes exist.

Imagine watching a fair coin land on heads five times in a row and feeling an increasingly strong intuition that the next flip is somehow due to produce tails. This intuition, though psychologically ①compelling, rests on a basic misunderstanding of probability, since each flip of a fair coin remains entirely ②independent of every flip that came before it. The coin possesses no memory of its previous outcomes, and its probability of landing on tails on the sixth flip stays ③fixed at fifty percent regardless of how many heads preceded it. Casinos have long profited from this misconception, watching gamblers place larger bets after a losing streak simply because they ④mistakenly believe that a win has become statistically overdue. Economists have even documented the same error among trained professionals, including loan officers who grow more likely to approve a risky application simply because they recently rejected several applications ⑤sporadically.

Behavioral economists have long observed that people tend to feel the pain of losing something more intensely than the pleasure of gaining an equivalent amount, a tendency known as loss aversion. Consider an investor who refuses to sell a declining stock, clinging to the hope that its price will eventually recover, even when all available evidence indicates that selling and reinvesting elsewhere would be more rational. As a result, loss aversion frequently pushes individuals toward ___________ rather than toward the outcome that would maximize their overall welfare.

Facial recognition software has moved rapidly into shopping malls, schools, and apartment buildings. Proponents note that it can unlock doors and speed up identity checks far faster than any human guard. Independent studies, however, have repeatedly found that many commercial systems perform less accurately on women and people with darker skin tones, which means that _______________. Several cities have already reported cases in which an innocent person was detained based on a flawed match.

Because the two sums occupy entirely separate mental categories, the household feels no contradiction in treating them so differently. Consider a household that maintains two separate financial habits that, from a purely economic standpoint, appear difficult to reconcile. ( ① ) On one hand, the household carefully sets aside a fixed percentage of its income each month into a long-term retirement account, resisting any temptation to withdraw from it early. ( ② ) On the other hand, the same household carries a persistent balance on a credit card, paying a substantial interest rate simply for the convenience of short-term borrowing. ( ③ ) A purely rational calculation would suggest withdrawing a small amount from savings to eliminate the higher-interest debt, since the interest earned on savings is far lower than the interest owed on the card. ( ④ ) Yet the household rarely considers this option, since retirement savings are mentally categorized as untouchable while credit card debt is treated as a separate, ongoing obligation. ( ⑤ ) This example illustrates how mental accounting can lead to financial choices that persist despite being demonstrably suboptimal.