영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Émile Durkheim insisted that sociology could become a genuine science only if it ①identified a distinct subject matter that could not be reduced to individual psychology. He termed this subject matter social facts, ②defining as ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that exist outside any single individual yet exert a coercive influence over that individual's behavior. Language, currency, legal codes, and religious ritual all ③qualify as social facts, since a person is born into these systems already fully formed and must conform to them regardless of personal preference. Durkheim insisted that social facts should be studied as things, meaning they must be ④examined empirically through observable patterns such as statistics. His study of suicide rates exemplified this method, showing that rates varied systematically according to variables such as religious affiliation and marital status, patterns that could not ⑤be explained by individual psychology alone.

Socialization is the lifelong process through which individuals absorb the norms, values, and roles ①that allow them to function within a society, beginning in the family and continuing through schools, peer groups, and workplaces. Most of this process unfolds gradually and ②is barely noticed by the people experiencing it. Resocialization, by contrast, refers to a deliberate and often abrupt process in which an individual ③is stripped of a previous identity and trained to adopt a new set of norms, typically within what sociologist Erving Goffman called a total institution. These institutions frequently begin the process with what Goffman termed a mortification of self, ④removed personal possessions and erasing markers of prior status so that recruits can be rebuilt according to institutional expectations. While resocialization can help individuals adapt to demanding new roles, critics note that total institutions can also produce lasting psychological strain by ⑤severing the very social ties that once anchored a person's sense of self.

Among the many tools available to those who design choice environments, few are as quietly powerful as the default option, the alternative that ①takes effect automatically unless a person actively selects something else. Because changing a default requires deliberate effort, many individuals simply accept whatever arrangement has been preselected for them, regardless of whether that arrangement actually ②serve their interests best. This tendency has been documented across a remarkably wide range of contexts. Countries that automatically enroll citizens in organ donation programs, requiring an explicit request to opt out, consistently report far higher donor registration rates than countries that require citizens ③to actively opt in. Employers who automatically enroll new hires in retirement savings plans likewise see participation rates ④climb dramatically compared with employers who leave enrollment entirely voluntary. What makes default options so influential is not merely convenience; a default also functions as an implicit signal about what is considered normal or recommended, subtly ⑤shaping perceptions even among individuals who believe themselves to be deciding independently.

When people look back on a multi-day journey, they ①rarely recall every hour with equal clarity; instead, memory tends to compress the entire experience into just a few representative moments. Psychologists have found that two points carry ②disproportionate weight in this process: the single moment when emotion, whether joy or discomfort, reached its highest intensity, and whatever happened right before the experience concluded. Consider two hikers who complete an identical five-day trek. The first finishes with a ③grueling, rain-soaked final climb, while the second enjoys a calm, scenic descent on the last afternoon despite having endured an equally difficult ascent earlier in the trip. Even though both hikers faced comparable hardship overall, the second is far ④less likely to remember the journey fondly, simply because the trip ended pleasantly. This pattern reveals that overall satisfaction is not calculated as an average of every experienced moment; rather, it is shaped disproportionately by whichever moments felt most ⑤intense and by however the experience happened to end.

Economists traditionally measured a community's wealth in terms of factories, income, or infrastructure, yet sociologists increasingly point to a less visible resource: social capital, the networks of trust and reciprocity that allow people to cooperate for mutual benefit. Robert Putnam popularized the concept by documenting a decline in civic participation, a trend he captured in the phrase bowling alone. Communities rich in social capital tend to enjoy lower crime and more effective local government, because neighbors who know and trust one another can coordinate informally without relying entirely on formal institutions. However, _______________. For this reason, researchers increasingly distinguish between bonding capital, which strengthens ties within a single group, and bridging capital, which connects otherwise separate communities.

Individuals rarely evaluate their own lives in isolation; instead, they measure their achievements, possessions, and status against a reference group, a set of people they use as a standard for comparison. This group need not be one to which a person actually belongs. Sociologists distinguish between normative reference groups, which shape a person's values and behavior, and comparative reference groups, which merely provide a benchmark for self-assessment. Robert Merton showed that soldiers who compared their promotion chances to peers within their own slow-moving unit often felt more satisfied than soldiers in units with faster promotion rates, because _______________. This counterintuitive finding demonstrates that satisfaction depends less on objective circumstances than on the group against which those circumstances are measured.

Two patients diagnosed with the same disease and prescribed the same medication can respond in strikingly different ways, one recovering quickly while the other experiences little benefit or even harmful side effects. (A) This approach has proven especially valuable in cancer treatment, where tumors from two patients with the same diagnosis may carry entirely different genetic mutations that respond to entirely different drugs, though widespread adoption still faces real obstacles, since genetic sequencing remains expensive in many regions. (B) By sequencing a patient's DNA before treatment begins, doctors can increasingly predict which medication is likely to work best and at what dose, replacing a strategy once described as one-size-fits-all with something closer to a tailored fit. (C) Precision medicine starts from the observation that this variation often traces back to differences buried in each patient's genome, differences that determine how efficiently a body absorbs, breaks down, or responds to a given drug.

When people are asked to judge how risky or beneficial a particular technology is, they rarely conduct anything resembling a careful cost-benefit analysis. (A) This mental shortcut, known as the affect heuristic, produces a curious pattern that traditional risk theory struggles to explain: activities people like tend to be judged as both safer and more beneficial, while activities they dislike are judged as both riskier and less beneficial, even when no logical relationship between risk and benefit exists. (B) Instead, they consult a quick emotional impression, an instinctive sense of whether the technology feels good or feels bad, and let that impression guide their entire judgment. (C) For example, when researchers presented a fictional industrial chemical alongside a brief description emphasizing its convenience, participants rated it not only as more useful but also, illogically, as less dangerous. Because emotional impressions form so rapidly and feel so trustworthy, correcting for this heuristic requires deliberate effort; simply presenting more accurate statistics to already anxious or enthusiastic audiences rarely changes their underlying judgment.

Their actual forecasting accuracy, however, has repeatedly proven no better than that of far less experienced participants, and sometimes even worse. Overconfidence among financial professionals presents a puzzling contradiction. ( ① ) Fund managers and analysts typically possess years of specialized training, access to vast quantities of market data, and considerable professional experience. ( ② ) One might reasonably expect such expertise to translate into consistently superior predictions about future market movements. ( ③ ) Longitudinal studies tracking professional forecasts against actual outcomes reveal a persistent gap between confidence and accuracy. ( ④ ) This finding does not imply that expertise is worthless, but it does suggest that expertise can inflate confidence more readily than it improves genuine predictive accuracy. ( ⑤ ) Investors would therefore do well to treat confident predictions, however credentialed their source, with a healthy measure of skepticism.

He termed the resulting gap cultural lag, describing the friction that appears when institutions have not yet caught up with new technological realities. Sociologist William Ogburn observed that when a society undergoes technological change, its material culture, meaning tools and inventions, tends to advance faster than its nonmaterial culture, meaning norms, laws, and values. ( ① ) The rise of the automobile, for instance, transformed daily mobility long before traffic laws, insurance systems, and urban planning fully adapted to the risks it introduced. ( ② ) A contemporary example can be found in genetic testing, which now allows individuals to learn detailed information about inherited disease risk well before most legal systems have settled questions about its use. ( ③ ) Cultural lag theory reminds us that technological progress is not automatically matched by social progress. ( ④ ) The resulting gap can produce confusion or exploitation until laws and customs eventually adjust to new material conditions. ( ⑤ )