영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Working memory refers to the mental workspace in which information ①is temporarily held and manipulated while a person performs a cognitive task. Such tasks include solving an arithmetic problem, following a rapid conversation, or holding a phone number in mind before dialing it. In the mid-twentieth century, the psychologist George Miller proposed that this workspace could accommodate roughly seven discrete items. His claim proved so influential that it ②become widely known as the magic number seven. Subsequent research, however, revealed that Miller's estimate was somewhat generous, since it failed to account for the complexity of the material ③being remembered. Nelson Cowan later argued that when rehearsal strategies ④are prevented and attention is tightly controlled, genuine capacity hovers closer to four items rather than seven. This discrepancy suggests that what earlier studies had measured was not raw storage capacity itself but a hybrid quantity ⑤inflated by clever strategies. Contemporary psychologists therefore distinguish between the fixed limit of working memory and the flexible techniques that allow individuals to transcend that limit.

When people look back on a multi-day journey, they rarely ①recall every hour with equal clarity; instead, memory tends to compress the entire experience into just a few representative moments. Psychologists have found that two points carry disproportionate weight in this process: the single moment when emotion, whether joy or discomfort, ②reached its highest intensity, and whatever happened right before the experience concluded. Consider two hikers who complete an identical five-day trek. The first finishes with a grueling, rain-soaked final climb, while the second enjoys a calm, scenic descent on the last afternoon despite having ③endure an equally difficult ascent earlier in the trip. Even though both hikers faced comparable hardship overall, the second is far more likely to remember the journey fondly, simply because the trip ④ended pleasantly. This pattern reveals that overall satisfaction is not calculated as an average of every experienced moment; rather, it is shaped disproportionately by whichever moments ⑤felt most intense and by however the experience happened to end.

For much of its history, economic theory treated emotion as a distortion ①to be eliminated from otherwise rational calculation, an obstacle standing between decision-makers and their true self-interest. More recent research, however, suggests that emotion ②function not merely as noise but as an integral component of sound judgment, one that supplies information conventional reasoning alone cannot readily access. Individuals who, due to specific neurological conditions, lose the capacity to experience emotion while retaining otherwise normal cognitive abilities frequently ③struggle to make even simple decisions, spending excessive time weighing options that most people resolve almost instantly through a felt sense of what seems right. This observation suggests that emotional responses often ④function as rapid heuristics, allowing individuals to bypass exhaustive deliberation by relying on accumulated affective associations built from past experience. Financial regulators have begun incorporating this understanding into policy design, recognizing that decisions made under conditions of acute emotional arousal often ⑤depart substantially from the measured judgment that individuals would exhibit under calmer circumstances.

Imagine two travelers ①preparing for the same trip: one refuses to fly after watching news coverage of a recent plane crash, while the other books a flight without hesitation. Statistically, air travel remains far safer than ②driving the same distance by car, yet vivid, emotionally charged images tend to dominate human judgment more powerfully than dry statistics ever could. This tendency, in which people ③estimate how likely an event is based on how easily examples come to mind rather than on actual data, quietly shapes countless everyday decisions. News broadcasts that repeatedly feature rare disasters can leave viewers ④convinced that such events are common, even though official records clearly show the opposite. Advertisers and politicians alike exploit this pattern, knowing that a single striking anecdote often ⑤persuade audiences more effectively than pages of careful statistics ever manage to.

Psychologists studying human judgment often describe the mind as ①operating through two distinct systems rather than a single unified process. System 1 works quickly and automatically, ②generating impressions and snap judgments without any noticeable sense of effort, much as a driver instinctively brakes when a ball suddenly rolls into the street. System 2, by contrast, is slow, deliberate, and demanding, engaged only when a problem ③require careful calculation or conscious reasoning. Most daily decisions are handled almost entirely by System 1, which allows people ④to function efficiently without exhausting their limited mental resources. This efficiency comes at a cost, however, because System 1 relies on simple shortcuts that can produce systematic errors, and System 2 is frequently too lazy or too occupied to double-check them. As a result, a judgment often feels most confident precisely at the moment when it has skipped the careful scrutiny that could have caught its own mistake, leaving the thinker unaware of how easily the impression was ⑤formed.

Suppose you meet a quiet, gentle man ①who speaks softly, tends a small garden, and organizes his bookshelf with meticulous care. ②Ask whether he is more likely a florist or a truck driver, most people instinctively choose florist, since his personality matches the stereotype so neatly. This judgment, however, ③ignores a crucial fact: truck drivers vastly outnumber florists in almost every country, which means that, statistically, he is far more likely to belong to the larger group regardless of how well he fits the flower-shop image. Relying on resemblance to a familiar category rather than on underlying numerical proportions, ④known among researchers as representativeness, leads people to overlook these base rates almost automatically. Even trained professionals, ⑤who should know better, often fall into the same trap when a vivid description feels more convincing than plain statistics.

When people estimate the value of an unfamiliar product, they rarely rely on objective calculation alone; instead, they anchor their judgment to whatever numerical reference happens to be presented first, however ①arbitrary that number may be. This phenomenon exerts a ②disproportionate influence on price perception precisely because initial figures function as a kind of cognitive gravity that subsequent estimates struggle to escape. A shopper who first sees a jacket listed at $300 before it is marked down to $150 will likely judge the discounted price as an excellent ③bargain, regardless of whether $150 actually reflects the jacket's true worth. Retailers, well aware of this bias, frequently display a ④deflated "original price" beside a discounted one, not because the higher figure is meaningful, but because it recalibrates customers' expectations. Even professionals are not immune: negotiators who open with an extreme initial offer often secure more ⑤favorable final terms than those who begin with a moderate one.

Consider a student who genuinely intends to study for tomorrow's exam yet, when the evening actually arrives, chooses to watch another episode of a favorite show instead, promising herself she will surely study harder next week. This pattern, in which the pull of an immediate pleasure overwhelms the value of a distant benefit, appears again and again across ordinary life, from postponed exercise to delayed savings. People do not necessarily fail to understand that the future reward matters more; rather, _______________. Behavioral economists note that this preference weakens considerably once both options are pushed into the future, which is why planning a diet starting next month feels effortless compared with skipping dessert tonight.

Hyperbolic discounting has direct implications for how retirement savings programs ought to be designed. (A) If employees are asked at the moment of hiring whether they wish to increase their contribution rate at a specific point in the future, many agree readily, since the sacrifice feels distant and therefore painless. (B) When that future date eventually arrives, however, the automatic increase proceeds smoothly precisely because the decision was locked in before the immediate discomfort of a smaller paycheck became salient. (C) This design, sometimes described as committing one's future self in advance, effectively exploits the very inconsistency that hyperbolic discounting predicts, turning a psychological weakness into a practical advantage.

Ironically, the more confident these investors become, the less likely they are to seek out disconfirming evidence at all. Confirmation bias exerts a particularly strong influence in financial markets, where uncertainty leaves considerable room for interpretation. ( ① ) An investor convinced that a certain stock is undervalued will often read every piece of ambiguous news as further proof of that belief. ( ② ) Positive earnings are taken as confirmation of the stock's hidden potential, while disappointing earnings are dismissed as a temporary anomaly rather than a genuine warning sign. ( ③ ) This selective interpretation allows the investor's initial conviction to grow stronger with each new piece of information, regardless of whether that information actually supports the belief. ( ④ ) Financial advisors therefore recommend that investors deliberately seek out opinions that challenge their existing positions before making major decisions. ( ⑤ ) Only by actively exposing oneself to disconfirming evidence can one guard against the self-reinforcing cycle that confirmation bias tends to produce.