영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

Philosophers sometimes ask their students to imagine a creature physically ①identically to an ordinary human being in every measurable respect, one that walks, talks, laughs, and even cries out in apparent pain when injured, yet that has no inner conscious experience whatsoever. This imagined being, commonly called a philosophical zombie, ②behaves exactly as a conscious person would, since every neuron fires in precisely the same pattern, but there is supposedly nothing it is like to be that creature from the inside. Defenders of the argument claim that because such a zombie is at least ③conceivable without any logical contradiction, consciousness itself cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. Critics respond that mere conceivability ④proves very little about what is genuinely possible in the real world, and that our intuition about zombies may simply ⑤reflect the limits of imagination rather than a real gap in nature.

The discovery of CRISPR gene-editing technology gave scientists a tool ①precise enough to correct a single mistaken letter in the human genome, raising hope for curing inherited diseases that have resisted treatment for generations. Yet the same precision that makes CRISPR so promising also makes it ②dangerous in the wrong hands. Editing a gene in a sperm, egg, or early embryo does not simply change one patient; it alters the genetic code passed down to every future generation, a decision no single person should be allowed to make ③alone. Scientific organizations around the world have therefore drawn a careful line, ⑤permitting gene editing to treat disease in existing patients while ④permitting any edit that would be inherited by their descendants. Critics worry, however, that as the technology becomes cheaper and more widely available, this line will become harder to enforce than it is to draw.

When people encounter an individual who appears to memorize enormous quantities of specialized information ①effortlessly, they often assume that person possesses an innate gift. Cognitive psychologists, however, contend that such feats ②rarely stem from raw talent alone. Instead, such feats arise from a learned skill known as chunking, whereby scattered pieces of information are consolidated into larger, meaningful units. A landmark study of chess players demonstrated this principle. When shown a board arranged according to plausible game positions, grandmasters reproduced the layout perfectly. Yet when the same pieces were scattered randomly, their performance ③collapsed to the level of novices. This pattern reveals that expert memory is not larger in raw capacity but is instead organized around patterns accumulated through years of deliberate practice. If chunking, rather than innate aptitude, ④contradicts expert performance, then educators should stop treating talent as fixed and destiny-bound. Curricula ought to be redesigned to cultivate pattern recognition explicitly, since doing so would grant far more students access to expertise once ⑤presumed reserved for the naturally gifted.

Two drivers, equally distracted by their phones, run a red light in exactly the same careless manner. By pure chance, a child happens to be crossing the street in front of one driver but not the other; the first driver kills the child, while the second driver drives through safely and never even notices the danger. Although both drivers behaved identically and made exactly the same reckless choice, society judges them very differently: one faces criminal charges and lifelong guilt, while the other receives, at most, a minor traffic ticket. Philosophers call this troubling asymmetry moral luck, since factors entirely outside a person's control end up determining how severely we judge their moral character. If moral responsibility is supposed to depend only on what a person chooses and intends, this outcome seems deeply unfair, yet few people are willing to excuse the unlucky driver as if nothing worse had happened. Moral luck suggests that _______________.

When sociologist Émile Durkheim studied suicide rates across different societies, he noticed something puzzling: rates rose not only during economic depression but also during sudden prosperity. He concluded that both crises share a common feature, the collapse of shared norms that once told individuals what to expect and how to behave. Decades later, Robert Merton extended the concept to explain deviance within stable societies, proposing that anomie also arises when a culture insists that everyone pursue identical goals, such as wealth, while denying many people the legitimate means to achieve them. Faced with this gap between aspiration and opportunity, _______________. Anomie theory therefore suggests that crime is less a product of individual failure than of structural imbalance within society itself.

Philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised a scenario to challenge a long-held assumption about moral responsibility: that a person can be blamed for an action only if they could genuinely have done otherwise. (A) Frankfurt used this scenario to argue that moral responsibility depends on the actual reasoning behind a choice, not on some abstract guarantee that an alternative path remained available. (B) Black's hidden mechanism made it impossible for the man to have chosen otherwise, yet most people still consider him fully responsible for what he freely decided to do. (C) Imagine a man named Black who secretly implants a device in another man's brain, ready to force a particular decision, though the second man ends up deciding entirely on his own to do exactly what Black wanted.

Imagine a brilliant scientist named Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room, learning everything physical science could ever teach about color. (A) Despite this complete physical knowledge, Mary herself has never actually seen a color, since every book, screen, and object in her world has been carefully restricted to shades of gray. (B) Suppose that one day Mary is finally released from the room and shown a ripe red tomato for the first time. (C) Philosopher Frank Jackson argued that Mary would learn something entirely new at that moment, namely what it actually feels like to see red, even though she already possessed every physical fact about color.

Classical economic theory long assumed that decision makers gather all relevant information, calculate every possible outcome, and select the single option that maximizes their benefit. (A) Herbert Simon, however, questioned this assumption, arguing that human beings operate under real constraints of time, knowledge, and mental capacity that make such exhaustive calculation practically impossible. (B) Instead of searching endlessly for the theoretically perfect choice, people typically stop once they find an option that seems good enough to meet their immediate needs, a strategy Simon termed satisficing. (C) A shopper comparing refrigerators, for example, rarely examines every model available; she instead sets a few practical criteria, such as price and size, and selects the first appliance that satisfies them adequately. This approach is not a failure of reasoning but rather a sensible adaptation to a world where information is costly and time is genuinely limited. Consequently, models assuming unlimited rationality often fail to predict actual behavior, while frameworks acknowledging these cognitive boundaries offer a far more realistic account of how ordinary decisions are actually made.

When people are asked to judge how risky or beneficial a particular technology is, they rarely conduct anything resembling a careful cost-benefit analysis. (A) This mental shortcut, known as the affect heuristic, produces a curious pattern that traditional risk theory struggles to explain: activities people like tend to be judged as both safer and more beneficial, while activities they dislike are judged as both riskier and less beneficial, even when no logical relationship between risk and benefit exists. (B) Instead, they consult a quick emotional impression, an instinctive sense of whether the technology feels good or feels bad, and let that impression guide their entire judgment. (C) For example, when researchers presented a fictional industrial chemical alongside a brief description emphasizing its convenience, participants rated it not only as more useful but also, illogically, as less dangerous. Because emotional impressions form so rapidly and feel so trustworthy, correcting for this heuristic requires deliberate effort; simply presenting more accurate statistics to already anxious or enthusiastic audiences rarely changes their underlying judgment.

Imagine a brilliant surgeon who has five patients, each dying from the failure of a different organ, and one healthy visitor in the waiting room whose organs happen to be a perfect match for all five. Philosophers often pair the classic trolley problem with a companion case designed to test whether our moral intuitions are actually consistent. ( ① ) If the surgeon secretly killed the healthy visitor and transplanted the organs, five lives would be saved at the cost of one, exactly the same arithmetic used to justify diverting a runaway trolley onto a track with a single worker. ( ② ) Yet almost everyone who accepts the trolley diversion recoils immediately at the idea of the surgeon cutting up an unwilling patient, even though the numbers are identical in both cases. ( ③ ) Philosophers use this contrast to argue that outcomes alone cannot fully explain our moral judgments. ( ④ ) Something about directly using a person's body as a mere means, rather than an unintended side effect of redirecting harm, appears to matter deeply to most people's sense of right and wrong. ( ⑤ )