영어 모의고사 (자동 편성)

People routinely seek out information that confirms what they already believe while ①overlooking or dismissing evidence that contradicts those beliefs, a pattern known as confirmation bias. This tendency operates not because individuals are deliberately dishonest, but because the mind finds it cognitively less ②taxing to absorb information that fits an existing framework than to reconstruct that framework from scratch. Investors who believe a particular company will succeed, for instance, tend to interpret ambiguous news about that company ③unfavorably, while investors who are skeptical of the same company interpret identical news unfavorably, even though both groups are examining the same underlying facts. Social media platforms can ④intensify this effect by algorithmically presenting users with content similar to what they have previously engaged with. Over time, such selective exposure can harden initial impressions into convictions that feel objectively verified, even though they rest on a systematically ⑤filtered sample of evidence.

Hospitals are increasingly adopting artificial intelligence tools that can scan medical images and flag potential tumors ①faster and, in some trials, more accurately than experienced radiologists. Patients understandably welcome any technology that catches disease earlier, yet the growing reliance on these tools raises an uncomfortable legal question that hospitals have only begun to address. When an AI system misses a diagnosis that a human doctor would likely have caught, responsibility becomes ②easy to assign. The doctor may argue that they simply trusted a tool the hospital required them to use, the hospital may argue that the software company guaranteed its accuracy, and the software company may argue that no algorithm can be expected to be ③perfect. Until legal systems ④clarify this chain of responsibility, patients harmed by an algorithmic error may find themselves with no clear party to hold ⑤accountable.

When people estimate the value of an unfamiliar product, they rarely rely on objective calculation alone; instead, they anchor their judgment to whatever numerical reference happens to be presented first, however ①arbitrary that number may be. This phenomenon exerts a ②disproportionate influence on price perception precisely because initial figures function as a kind of cognitive gravity that subsequent estimates struggle to escape. A shopper who first sees a jacket listed at $300 before it is marked down to $150 will likely judge the discounted price as an excellent ③bargain, regardless of whether $150 actually reflects the jacket's true worth. Retailers, well aware of this bias, frequently display a ④deflated "original price" beside a discounted one, not because the higher figure is meaningful, but because it recalibrates customers' expectations. Even professionals are not immune: negotiators who open with an extreme initial offer often secure more ⑤favorable final terms than those who begin with a moderate one.

Classical economic theory assumes that consumers evaluate every price change in the same rational way, weighing marginal benefit against marginal cost regardless of the absolute numbers involved. Behavioral economists, however, have discovered a striking exception: the moment a price drops to exactly zero, people's judgment shifts in a way that ordinary discounting cannot explain. In a well-known laboratory experiment, participants chose between two chocolates, one of higher quality priced at a small fee and one of lower quality offered for free. When both prices were merely reduced by the same amount, most participants still preferred the higher-quality option. Yet once the cheaper chocolate's price was lowered to zero, the majority abruptly switched their preference, even though the price gap between the two options had not actually changed. Researchers explain this reversal by noting that _______________.

Individuals confronted with a set of options frequently default to whichever alternative requires no active decision at all, a tendency scholars term the status quo bias. When employees must actively opt into a retirement savings plan, participation rates remain stubbornly low; yet when the same plan is presented as automatic unless an employee opts out, participation rises dramatically. Because inaction carries no vivid regret, the status quo comes to feel safer than it objectively is, illustrating how ___________ can masquerade as a deliberate preference.

Philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised a scenario to challenge a long-held assumption about moral responsibility: that a person can be blamed for an action only if they could genuinely have done otherwise. Imagine a man named Black who secretly implants a device in another man's brain, ready to force a particular decision if the second man shows any sign of choosing differently. The second man, however, decides entirely on his own to perform the very action Black wanted, and the device never activates at all. Black's hidden mechanism made it impossible for the man to have chosen otherwise, yet most people still consider him fully responsible for what he freely decided to do. Frankfurt used this scenario to argue that _______________.

Identical information can provoke strikingly different reactions depending on how it is worded, a phenomenon economists call the framing effect. Patients told that a surgical procedure carries a ninety percent survival rate tend to consent to it far more readily than patients told that the same procedure carries a ten percent mortality rate, even though the two descriptions convey exactly the same statistical reality. Recognizing how deeply framing shapes judgment is therefore essential, not because the underlying facts change, but because the very same facts, dressed in different language, can lead reasonable people toward ___________ conclusions.

Imagine a brilliant scientist named Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room, learning everything physical science could ever teach about color, including the exact wavelengths of light and the precise neural processes triggered when a person sees red. Despite this complete physical knowledge, Mary herself has never actually seen a color; every book, screen, and object in her world has been carefully restricted to shades of gray. Suppose that one day Mary is finally released from the room and shown a ripe red tomato for the first time. Philosopher Frank Jackson argued that Mary would learn something entirely new at that moment, namely what it actually feels like to see red, even though she already possessed every physical fact about color there was to know beforehand. If Mary genuinely gains new knowledge upon leaving the room, then _______________.

Retailers have discovered practical ways to counteract the negative effects of choice overload without simply reducing the number of products they offer. (A) One common strategy involves organizing an extensive product catalog into clearly labeled categories and subcategories, allowing customers to narrow their search gradually rather than confronting the entire array at once. (B) Another approach highlights a small number of curated recommendations, such as "staff picks" or "best sellers," giving hesitant customers a reasonable starting point without eliminating other options entirely. (C) Both strategies share a common principle: they do not reduce the objective number of choices available but instead reduce the cognitive burden of navigating them.

Ordinary evidence cannot help here, since any proof gathered through the senses would itself be generated by the same simulation being tested. Suppose a mad scientist removed a living brain from its body, placed it in a vat of nutrient fluid, and connected its neurons to a supercomputer capable of generating perfectly realistic sensations. ( ① ) The brain would experience a full and convincing world, complete with a sky, a body, and other people, without ever suspecting that none of it existed outside the simulation. ( ② ) This scenario, unsettling as it sounds, raises a genuinely difficult question for anyone confident in their own perception: how could a person ever prove that they are not that very brain right now? ( ③ ) Some philosophers conclude that absolute certainty about the external world is simply unattainable. ( ④ ) Others argue, however, that the mere possibility of deception, however vivid, is not sufficient reason to abandon our everyday trust in what we perceive. ( ⑤ ) Ordinary caution, after all, can never fully settle which side is correct.